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We model the impact of public and private ownership structures on rmsincentives to invest
in innovative projects. We show that it is optimal to go public when exploiting existing ideas and
optimal to go private when exploring new ideas. This result derives from the fact that private rms
are less transparent to outside investors than are public rms. In private rms, insiders can time
the market by choosing an early exit strategy if they receive bad news. This option makes insiders
more tolerant of failures and thus more inclined to invest in innovative projects. In contrast, the
prices of publicly traded securities react quickly to good news, providing insiders with incentives
to choose conventional projects and cash in early. (JEL G24, G32, O32)
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We introduce a model in which the form of equity nancing either public or private a¤ects
managersincentives to innovate. Our main contribution is to show that private ownership creates
incentives for innovation, whereas public ownership disincentivizes innovation. As we allow for an
endogenous choice of ownership structure, the model also provides, to the best of our knowledge, a
novel explanation for the decision to go public or private. We nd that this decision is a¤ected by
the relative protability of innovative and conventional projects.
The logic of our model is as follows. A risk-neutral insider chooses between a conventional
project and an innovative project. Following March (1991), we call the conventional project the
exploitation of existing ideas and the innovative project the exploration of new ideas. Both projects
generate cash ow in two consecutive periods. The insider has an option to liquidate his stake early
by selling shares in the rst period. Under private ownership, if the insider can time the market by
choosing an early exit after receiving bad news, the insider becomes more tolerant of early failures
and thus more inclined to invest in the innovative project. This tolerance-for-failure e¤ect is the
key determinant of innovation in private companies.
Under public ownership, cash ow is observable, and thus an early exit after receiving bad news
is not protable. Therefore, there is no tolerance for failures in public companies. Furthermore,
the market prices of public securities react quickly to good news. This rapid incorporation of good
news into market prices creates incentives for short-termist behavior. Thus, the insider may prefer
the conventional project because it has a higher probability of early success. We show that the
equilibrium under public ownership implies a positive probability of investment in the conventional
project, even if innovation is ex ante e¢ cient.
In sum, our model shows that the incentives in public rms are biased towards conventional
projects, whereas the incentives in private rms are biased towards innovative projects. Conse-
quently, holding all else constant, the optimal structure of ownership public or private changes
with the rms life cycle and depends on whether the exploitation of existing ideas or the exploration
of new ideas is optimal.
We interpret our model as a theory of the evolution of ownership structures. Innovation is
very important early in the life of a rm or industry. In an emerging industry, rms experiment
with di¤erent varieties of products (Keppler 1996). Our model predicts that rms should start
under private ownership to provide incentives for exploration and experimentation. Our model also
predicts that rms should go private when they need to undertake risky restructurings. Whenever
a rm needs to reinvent itself, it makes sense to do so out of the public eye. Major restructurings,
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involving radical changes in strategy, are more properly motivated under private ownership.1
There is evidence that private rms are more innovative than are public rms. Using patent
citation data, Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) nd that rms invest in more inuential
innovations after being acquired by private equity (PE) funds. Although most PE targets in their
sample were already private, some of the most signicant improvements in patent quality were
associated with public-to-private transitions. For example, Seagate Technologies, which is the
largest patentee in their sample of PE targets, was initially a public company. Lerner, Sorensen,
and Strömberg (2011) show that Seagate lagged behind its competitors in terms of the number
of patents and citations in the years before they were bought by Silver Lake Partners. Seagates
innovative position improved signicantly after the buyout.
Our model also has implications for the empirical literature dealing with the real e¤ects of
venture capital and buyout investments. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) review this literature and
conclude that private equity investment creates value because of tax benets and the exploitation
of mispricings in the debt and equity markets, and also by a¤ecting corporate behavior, such as
operations and investments. Our model suggests that PE funds can a¤ect innovative investments
via the decision to go public or private. Furthermore, our theory suggests that controlling for the
type of transition (e.g., public-to-private vs. private-to-private) is at least as important in empirical
work as is controlling for the type of investment (buyout vs. venture capital).2
The article is structured as follows. After discussing the related literature in Section 1, we
present the model setup in Section 2 and separately discuss the private and public cases in Sections
3 and 4, respectively. We then bring these two cases together and discuss the choice between going
public or private in Section 5. We discuss the case of illiquid private securities in Section 6 and
conclude with a discussion of the empirical implications in Section 7, to which we add some nal
remarks in Section 8. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1. Related Literature
Our work ts with an emerging body of theoretical and empirical literature that deals with the roles
of ownership structures and nancing choices in corporate innovation. An early example is Aghion
and Tirole (1994); more recent works include Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2009), Atanassov,
Nanda, and Seru (2007), Belenzon, Berkovitz, and Bolton (2009), Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006,
2009), and Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009). These articles focus on related but di¤erent questions,
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such as the impact of capital structure, governance, organization, and ownership concentration on
corporate innovation.
Our model is closely related to four di¤erent veins of theoretical literature:
(1) Interactions between stock prices and investment in rms. An extensive body of
literature examines the role of stock prices in guiding corporate investment decisions and a¤ecting
insiders incentives more generally. An incomplete list includes Holmström and Tirole (1993),
Khanna, Slezak, and Bradley (1994), Dow and Gorton (1997), Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004),
Almazan, Banerji, and Motta (2008), and Edmans (2009).
Our model is particularly related to models of managerial short-termism. Stein (1989) develops
a model of rational short-termism driven by the stock market. In his model, in an attempt to
mislead the market, rms take actions to boost current earnings at the cost of lower future earnings.
In equilibrium, the market is not fooled and managers are stuck with an ine¢ cient strategy. In a
similar vein, Chemmanur and Jiao (2007) develop a model of the choice of security-voting structure,
in which market-driven short-termism plays a key role. In their model, entrepreneurs may prefer to
go public with a dual-class share structure to commit to pursuing long-term strategies. By selling
equity without votes, the entrepreneur can insulate himself from short-term market pressure. This
form of managerial entrenchment can be benecial in situations in which agency costs are low.
Our model has similar implications. If the rm is public, a manager may choose the conventional
project even if the innovative project has a higher net present value, because the former has a
higher probability of generating high earnings in the short run. However, our model also depicts
the alternative situation. If the rm is private, and thus free from pressure to boost current
earnings, the manager puts too much emphasis on future cash ows. Without the stock market
punishing short-term declines in earnings, managers become rationally biased towards innovative
projects, which are risky but very protable if successful. This bias gives rise to the phenomenon of
ine¢ cient long-termism. Innovation may be chosen even if it is inferior to conventional methods.
Thus, our model provides a more balanced view of market incentives. Whereas managers of public
rms may excessively focus on current earnings, managers of private rms may excessively focus
on future earnings. The best structure thus depends on the nature of the projects available to the
rm.
(2) Information disclosure and innovation. Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) were the rst
to propose a model in which rms may compromise their ability to innovate if they disclose infor-
mation to outside investors. In their model, an innovative rm in need of external nance faces a
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trade-o¤ when choosing whether to disclose private information about its innovative capabilities.
On the one hand, information disclosure allows the rm to obtain external funds with more ad-
vantageous terms. On the other hand, disclosure reveals crucial information to competitors and
reduces the rms initial advantage in a patent race. Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) develop a
model that is based on a similar trade-o¤. In their model, rms choose between a new or existing
technology and then decide whether to nance future rounds of investment with either public or
private o¤erings. Public o¤erings are assumed to be cheaper, but they reveal information about
industry protability to potential competitors. Thus, rms may strategically delay nancing or
resort to private o¤erings to prevent entry. In a more recent article, Spiegel and Tookes (2009)
develop and estimate a dynamic oligopoly model that incorporates some of the trade-o¤s originally
highlighted in Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) and Maksimovic and Pichler (2001), and they also
analyze a number of new trade-o¤s. For example, their duopoly model generates predictions con-
cerning the impact of the competitive environment on innovation and nancing decisions. Large
rms facing small rivals have more incentives to innovate because small rms nd it too costly to
compete by producing their own innovations. This e¤ect changes the perceived costs and benets
of acquiring market share.
Our model di¤ers from this body of literature because of our focus on the role of information
asymmetry in incentives to innovate. In particular, our model is concerned with the e¤ect of the
way in which rms are nanced on their internal incentives to choose between di¤erent technologies.
Thus, our model allows us to address a di¤erent question; should the decision to go public or private
depend on the relative protability of innovative versus old technologies?
(3) Insider trading and incentives to innovate. In a seminal article, Hirshleifer (1971)
shows that the option to trade on the basis of private information can provide additional incen-
tives for engaging in innovative activities. He distinguishes between the technological benets of
innovations the value created by the technological improvements made possible by an innovation
and their pecuniary benets, which are the gains to the innovator from his ability to speculate in
markets that will be a¤ected by a particular innovation. If the pecuniary benets are large, entre-
preneurs may wish to pursue innovations even when the social value of those innovations is negative.
A similar logic is present in our model. In opaque rms, insiders may choose to innovate mainly
for the pecuniary benets of innovation. Thus, private rms may innovate excessively.
Another article that is particularly related to ours is that of Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994).
They show that the ability to trade on the basis of private information provides managers with
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incentives to undertake risky projects. The ability to sell shares before information about low
protability becomes public works as a put option that convexies the payo¤s enjoyed by insiders,
which makes risky projects more attractive. The same e¤ect is present in our model but only in
some cases. Our analysis is di¤erent in that we compare di¤erent levels of information asymmetry
so that we can characterize the conditions under which the opposite result obtains, i.e., insider
trading may also lead to the selection of safer projects.
(4) The decision to go public or private. Our article is also related to a large body of liter-
ature about the choice between public and private structures. Examples include Shah and Thakor
(1988), Zingales (1995), Pagano and Roel (1998), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), and Boot,
Gopalan, and Thakor (2006), among many others. None of these articles consider the incentives
for innovation as a determinant of ownership structures.
2. Model Setup
A risk-neutral insider initially holds all of the shares of a rm. The insider has no initial wealth, is
protected by limited liability, and has outside utility normalized to zero. We view the insider as a
manager-entrepreneur who founded the rm and initially owns it in full. Because the identity of the
manager is not important in our model, we assume that the founder remains the manager regardless
of the number of initial shares the founder sells to other investors. All results are unchanged if the
founder is replaced by a newly hired professional manager.
2.1 Technology
The insider has to choose between two projects, projects 1 and 2, at two consecutive dates, dates
0 and 1. Each project has two possible outcomes: success or failure. Success yields payo¤ S, and
failure yields payo¤ F , S > F . We call project 1 the exploitation of existing ideas and project 2
the exploration of new ideas. This setup is similar to that in Manso (2011).
If the insider chooses project 1, the conventional project, the probability of success is p > 0.
The probability p is known to everyone. If the insider chooses project 2, the innovative project, the
probability of success is q > 0, which is unknown. It is only possible to learn about q if the insider
chooses project 2. We assume that E [qjF ] < E [q] < E [qjS]. That is, the expectation of success
increases if project 2 is successful at date 1 and decreases if project 2 fails at date 1.
The insider will only consider choosing the innovative project if the innovative project has a
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chance of delivering higher payo¤s than does the conventional project. Thus, we also assume that
E [qjS] > p to eliminate the trivial case in which project 1 strictly dominates project 2. Conversely,
the insider would always choose the innovative project if E [q], the unconditional probability of
success, is higher than p. We only consider the more interesting case in which E [q] < p. To
economize on algebra and notation, we dene  and  such that p = E [q] and p = E [qjS]. Our
assumptions imply that 0 <  < 1 and 1 <  < 1=p. To summarize,
p = E [q] < p < E [qjS] = p. (1)
Equation (1) encapsulates all of the characteristics of project 2. Project 2 is exploratory because
it is only possible to learn about the new method by trying it. Project 2 is promising because,
conditional on being successful at date 1, its probability of success is higher than the probability
of success associated with project 1. We can think of radical methods that seem unlikely to work
but would greatly improve upon current methods if they did work. The interpretation of  and 
is that a method is more radical the smaller is  and the higher is .
The total prot (gross of any initial investment costs) is given by the undiscounted sum of
payo¤s,  = x1 + x2, where xt is equal to F or S. We call xt earnings. We assume that earnings
are only liquid at date 2. That is, earnings x1 are realized at date 1, but dividends based on x1 are
paid at date 2. More generally, we wish to capture a situation in which it is possible to observe, at
date 1, a signal x1 about future prots. We call x1 earnings at date 1 to simplify exposition, but
it can also be understood as a signal at date 1 about the prot at date 2.
The insider makes an initial investment, I, paid in cash, to produce positive earnings by investing
in either project. Without this initial investment, all earnings are equal to zero, regardless of the
project chosen.
The insider may switch from one project to the other after observing x1. If the insider initially
chooses to exploit the old method, the option to switch has zero value. However, if the initial
choice is to explore the new method to maximize rm value, the insider switches to project 1 after
observing x1 = F . The option to switch is valuable under exploration. If the new method is
tried but fails, the insider returns to the old method. Figure 1 provides a visual summary of the
technology, taking into account the option to switch.
Figure 1 about here 
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To simplify the notation, we make F = 0 and S = 1, without loss of generality. Under
exploitation (project 1), the ex ante value of the rm, gross of the initial investment cost, is
v1 = p (1 + p) + (1  p)p. This expression implies
v1 = 2p: (2)
If the insider chooses exploration (project 2), the rm continues to use the innovative method
in the case of a success at date 1. In the case of failure, the rm returns to the old method (project
1). The ex ante value of the rm under exploration is then v2 = p (1 + p) + (1  p) p or
v2 = p f1 +  [1 + p (   1)]g . (3)
The innovative project (project 2) is ex ante preferable to the conventional project (project 1)
if and only if v2   v1  0. We have
v2   v1 > 0 if and only if  [1 + p (   1)] > 1. (4)
2.2 Liquidity and nancial market frictions
The key nancial market friction in our model is the existence of a demand for liquid assets caused
by (unmodeled) borrowing constraints. The insider has a utility function, as in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), of
U (c1; c2) =
8<: c1 with probability ,c2 with probability 1  , (5)
where ct is consumption at date t. This reduced-form approach is common in microeconomic models
of liquidity shocks (see, e.g., Freixas and Rochet 1997). With probability , a liquidity shock forces
the insider to consume at date 1. With probability 1 , there is no liquidity shock and dividends
and consumption are synchronized at date 2. We can think of liquidity shocks as representing
di¤erent types of consumers. Insiders that do not su¤er a liquidity shock are called late consumers.
Insiders that su¤er a liquidity shock are early consumers.3
For liquidity shocks to have an impact on decisions, we need to assume that the insider faces
borrowing constraints. The assumption of limited liability eliminates uncollateralized borrowing.
The assumption of zero initial wealth implies that the insider has no initial collateral. We need to
assume further that the insider cannot borrow by using his own shares as collateral.
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Liquid securities, such as cash, can be stored from one period to the following period at no cost.
There is no discounting or systematic risk in the economy.
2.3 Project nancing
The insider must sell securities backed by future earnings to nance the initial investment, I, as the
insider has no initial wealth. The insider may sell securities to either private or public investors.
The initial investment, I, is observable to all and is contractible. Thus, the insider must pay I to
undertake one of the projects if he sells securities to raise funds. The insider cannot run away with
the money or invest in a third project.
We assume that share contracts are the only securities available. This assumption is for the
simplicity of exposition. Capital structure choices are relevant in our model (i.e., the model does
not exist in a Modigliani-Miller world), but they do not change the qualitative results regarding
the choice between private and public ownership structures.4
2.4 Investor types
There are two types of investors: sophisticated and unsophisticated. Both types of investors are
fully rational. Unsophisticated investors only observe publicly available information. There are a
large number of such investors in the economy. Thus, these investors behave competitively, and
their trades are zero net present value transactions, conditional on all public information available
at the time they occur. Sophisticated investors can observe inside information at the time they
trade. That is, sophisticated investors always have the same information as the insider. Consistent
with the idea that information and expertise are costly to acquire, we assume that sophisticated
investors are in short supply.
We dene the fundamental value of shares as the value that those shares will have if kept until
the end of date 2. The fundamental value of shares may di¤er from the market value of shares,
which is what unsophisticated investors will pay for the shares in equilibrium.
If the insider wishes to sell some of his shares, he can either sell them to some of the unso-
phisticated investors or search for a sophisticated investor who is willing to buy shares. Because
sophisticated investors are in short supply (or, equivalently, they have shallow pockets), the insider
can only nd a sophisticated investor with some positive probability e < 1. With probability 1  e,
the insider has no other option but to trade with unsophisticated investors. Once the insider meets
a sophisticated investor, they bargain over the price of the shares to be sold. The surplus from
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trading with the sophisticated investor is   v V , where v is the fundamental value of the shares
being traded and V is the market value of those shares. The fraction of the surplus captured by
the sophisticated investor is , which measures the bargaining power of sophisticated investors.
For simplicity, we assume that the market does not observe the negotiations between insiders and
sophisticated investors.
Our assumptions about investor heterogeneity are standard. For example, Bolton, Santos, and
Scheinkman (2011) similarly assume that informed investors are in short supply and uninformed
investors are in innite supply. We interpret informed, sophisticated investors as venture capitalists
or private equity investors, who would only invest in businesses that they understand well. As it
might not be possible for the insider to nd an informed private buyer for his shares, sometimes
the only option is to sell to small retail investors.
2.5 Di¤erences between private and public ownership structures
The key results of our model depend on only one di¤erence between private and public ownership.
This di¤erence is the ability of outsiders to observe the interim earnings, x1, of a public rm
but not of a private rm. Under public ownership, we assume that the interim earnings x1 are
observable by everyone. Under private ownership, in contrast, only the insider, current private
investors, and future sophisticated investors observe x1. These assumptions capture the fact that
public companies are more transparent than are private companies. Public companies are subject
to tighter disclosure requirements, such as quarterly earnings reports and comprehensive annual
reports, analyst coverage, and the aggregation of dispersed information into the stock price via
trading.
For the sake of realism and to permit the analysis of di¤erent trade-o¤s, we also allow for other
di¤erences between the two structures, such as the cost of capital and liquidity costs. These enrich
the model but are not necessary for any of the qualitative results linking innovation incentives and
the choice between going public or private.
We assume that there are transaction costs associated with raising funds for investment through
public o¤erings.5 We capture the costs of issuing public equity by parameter cpub 2 (0; 1), such
that each dollar sold in public o¤erings yields only cpub to the rm. A large cpub implies a small
discount.
Raising capital through private sales also involves transaction costs. We denote the discount
factor associated with private securities by cpriv 2 (0; 1). This parameter is likely to change with
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changes in the institutional environment and the state of the economy. For example, when interest
rates are relatively low, private equity funds can borrow cheaply, and thus going private becomes
less costly for the rm. Private equity booms are thus associated with high levels of cpriv.6
We make no assumptions with respect to the relative cost of public equity capital cpriv   cpub.
Thus, our model allows for situations in which funds for investment are cheaper if nanced by public
securities (cpub > cpriv) and cases in which being private reduces the cost of capital (cpub < cpriv).
One justication for going public is to improve the liquidity of insider shareholdings (Chemma-
nur and Fulghieri 1999; Ritter and Welch 2002). For example, consider the case of a founder that
su¤ers a liquidity shock and needs to sell shares quickly. If the rm is privately held, the founder
may have to negotiate with a limited number of private investors. In contrast, under public owner-
ship the founder may be able to sell his shares more easily through organized markets. To capture
a potential liquidity advantage of public equity, we assume that each dollar in shares sold by the
insider at date 1 (the liquidity shock period) yields only k  1 if the company is private. No such
discount happens if the rm is public. To focus on the main mechanism that explains our key
results, we initially assume that there is no liquidity discount if the insider sells his own shares,
k = 1. In Section 6, we analyze the case in which k < 1.
2.6 The structure of information and timing of events
At date 0, the insider decides to sell either a fraction 1 priv of the shares to private investors or a
fraction 1  pub to public markets. We assume that public investors are unsophisticated. Private
investors can be either sophisticated or unsophisticated. However, at date 0, this distinction is
irrelevant because information is symmetric. The insider needs to raise at least I in cash to pay
for the initial investment cost. After paying I, the insider chooses either project 1 or project 2.
Outside investors cannot observe which project was chosen. Private investors, in contrast, have the
same information as the insider.
At date 1, the insider observes the rst realization of earnings x1 2 f0; 1g and then chooses
project 1 or project 2. Again, this choice is unobservable to outsiders. The insider then learns about
his liquidity needs. If the insider is an early consumer, he sells all of the shares that he owns. With
probability e the insider has the option to sell his shares to either a sophisticated private investor
or the public market, where prices are determined by perfect competition among unsophisticated
investors. Because sophisticated investors know everything that the insider knows, the insider may
prefer to sell to public markets, even if private buyers are available. With probability 1   e, the
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insider has no other option but to sell to public investors, regardless of the market valuation of the
shares. If the insider is instead a late consumer, he may sell some of the shares or keep them until
date 2. After observing whether the insider places orders to sell the shares, the market forms a
price for the shares.
At date 2, the second-period earnings, x2 2 f0; 1g, are realized, shareholders receive dividends,
x1+x2, and the rm is liquidated. The liquidation value is normalized to zero. Figure 2 shows the
time line.
Figure 2 about here
2.7 Equilibrium
The game is played by one insider and innitely many potential investors. Unsophisticated investors
(also referred to as the market) are in unlimited supply. Sophisticated investors are available
with probability e. At date 0, before decisions are made, there is no meaningful di¤erence between
the two types of investors. All investors, regardless of type, become fully informed after buying
shares in a private rm. At date 1, all sophisticated investors have the same information set as the
insider. The market only observes public information.
The insider takes actions at dates 0 and 1. At date 0, the insider rst chooses between a private
structure and a public structure, ' 2 fpriv; pubg. All of the actions that follow are conditional on
the choice of '. The insider also chooses the fraction of shares sold to investors, ' 2 [0; 1]. Finally,
the insider chooses project 2 with probability ' 2 [0; 1].
At date 1, the insider learns his type,  2 fearly consumer, late consumerg, and whether sophis-
ticated investors are available, " 2 favailable, not availableg. The insider also learns x1 2 f0; 1g.
The insider knows which project was chosen,  2 f1; 2g. The insider sells shares to the market
with probability b' (x1; ;  ; ") 2 [0; 1] and sells shares to sophisticated investors with probability
l' (x1; ;  ; ") 2 [0; 1].
At date 0, the investors value the shares of the rm at u'. At date 1, the market observes
whether the insider sells shares to the public, n 2 fSale, No Saleg. The market only observes the
value of x1 2 f0; 1g if the rm is public. To summarize, the markets information set at date 1
is (n; ) 2 fSale, No Saleg  fx1 = 0; x1 = 1; (x1 = 0) [ (x1 = 1)g : The market values the shares
of the rm at date 1 at V' (n; ). Because of perfect competition, V' (n; ) is also the price that
the market pays for each share. The sophisticated investors value the shares of the rm at date 1
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at ' (x1; ;  ; "), i.e., they have the same information set as the insider. They are willing to pay
V' (n; ) + (1  ) (' (x1; ;  ; ")  V' (n; )) for each share, where  2 [0; 1] denotes the fraction
of the surplus that is captured by the sophisticated investors, which is exogenously given.
The investors form beliefs about how the game is played in equilibrium. Without loss of gen-
erality, let all investors share the same beliefs   (; b; l) about the unobservable choices made by
the insider. Let  denote the (stochastic) value of the company to shareholders.
Denition 1. For each set of parameters (p; ; ; k; ; e; cpriv; c pub; I; ), an equilibrium is a prole
of strategies, valuations, and beliefs such that
1. at date 1, b' (x1; ;  ; ") and l

' (x1; ;  ; ") maximize the insiders expected payo¤, given
V ' (n; ) and 

' (x1; ;  ; ");
2. at date 0, '; '; and 





' (x1; ;  ; "),
l' (x1; ;  ; "), V

' (n; ) ; and 

' (x1; ;  ; ");
3. new investorsvaluations of shares are given by V ' (n; ) = E [ j n; ; '; ]; ' (x1; ;  ; ") =
E [ j x1; ;  ; "; '; ] and u' = E [ j '; ];




' (x1; ;  ; ") ; l

' (x1; ;  ; ")

;
5. probabilities are always updated in accordance Bayesrule.
This is a perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Parts 1 and 2 imply that an equilibrium must
satisfy sequential rationality. Part 3 implies that the new investorsvaluations must be rational.
Part 4 implies that the investors must hold rational expectations, i.e., beliefs about the insiders
behavior must be correct. Part 5 implies Bayesian rationality.
As will become clear when we characterize the equilibrium, all nodes of the game tree are
reached with a strictly positive probability in equilibrium. There is no need to impose rules for
updating beliefs at nodes o¤ the equilibrium path, as there are no such nodes. Any deviation by
the insider goes undetected, implying that the beliefs remain xed at , even if the insider chooses
an o¤-the-equilibrium action.
3. Private Ownership
Characterizing the set of equilibria for this game requires many steps, as one sees in Denition 1.
Because the choice of ' 2 fpriv; pubg is e¤ectively a choice between two quite distinct subgames,
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we rst analyze each of these two cases separately. We then consider the decision to go public or
private in Section 5.
First, consider the case of private ownership, i.e., at date 0, the insider sells 1  priv shares to
private investors. We take priv as exogenous for now and then work backwards to nd the optimal
priv.
After 1   priv shares are sold, at the end of date 0, the insider chooses either project 1 or
2. Recall that the project choice is the private information of the insider. The intuition is that,
although investments may be observable, the insider has unique information that allows him to
assess the characteristics of the available projects. This is a natural assumption, which is consistent
with the view that a managers unique expertise may be essential for investment decisions.
Let priv 2 [0; 1] be the probability that the insider chooses project 2 (innovation). We allow for
the possibility of equilibria involving mixed strategies. Intuitively, a strictly mixed strategy could
be also interpreted as an intermediate project, which is more innovative than is project 1 but is not
as radical as project 2. Our goal is to compute the equilibrium project choice, priv, under private
ownership.
3.1 Selling behavior at date 1
At the end of date 1, after observing x1, the insider chooses whether to retain or sell the shares of the
rm. We assume that the current private investors may also experience a liquidity shock and this
shock is perfectly correlated with the insiders liquidity shock. Thus, the current private investors
cannot buy out the insider after a liquidity shock. This assumption is stronger than necessary and
is made only for simplicity.7 As the insider and the current investors have identical preferences and
share the same information set at date 1, they will exhibit the same optimal behavior. Thus, we
need only to characterize the insiders behavior.
The insider either sells to new private buyers, who are sophisticated, or to public investors via
an initial public o¤ering (IPO). Private buyers are available with probability e < 1. Trading with
a private buyer is optimal only if the surplus   v   V is positive, where v is the fundamental
value of the rm and V is the value of the rm in an IPO. If the surplus is negative, the insider
prefers an IPO to a private sale. To put it di¤erently, a private sale is attractive only if the market
undervalues the rm, i.e., if v > V . If  > 0 and a private buyer is available, the insider and the
buyer nd themselves in a bilateral monopoly situation. Let  2 [0; 1] denote the fraction of the
surplus that is captured by the private buyer. The insiders payo¤ per share, conditional on selling
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to private investors, is given by V + (1  ) (v   V ). The insider strictly prefers a private sale if
 < 1. To save on notation, we assume that  is zero so that the insider always captures the full
surplus when trading with a private buyer. This assumption is not necessary; the analysis that
follows is well dened for any value of  (although it is trivial if  = 1).8
The insider receives the fundamental value of the shares v if he sells to private buyers. Private
buyers thus o¤er liquidity insurance to the insider. We say that the insider has liquidity needs if
the insider su¤ers a liquidity shock and there are no private buyers available. Insiders with liquidity
needs must sell shares in public markets. Insiders without liquidity needs may behave strategically
and go public to exploit potential mispricings.
We now consider how the market updates its beliefs if there is an IPO at date 1. Let m be
the posterior probability that the insider has liquidity needs, conditional on a public sale (IPO),
at date 1. A small m means that the market assigns a high probability to the case in which the
insider sells for strategic reasons.
An insider with liquidity needs (i.e., an early-consumer insider who cannot nd a private in-
vestor) has no other option but to sell shares to the market (i.e., to make an IPO). An insider
without liquidity needs chooses whether or not to sell to the market. The following lemma de-
scribes the insiders behavior when earnings are x1 = 1.
Lemma 1. In the private ownership case, an insider without liquidity needs never sells shares to
the market at date 1 after observing a success (x1 = 1).
An insider without liquidity needs who sees x1 = 1 would only sell shares in public markets if
he believes that the shares are overvalued. After a success, the fundamental value of one share is
either 1 + p or 1 + p. The proof of Lemma 1 shows that the market price at date 1 is lower than
1 + p. Intuitively, the market expects the insider to be more likely to sell after a failure than after
a success. Market rationality then rules out those share prices that are not compatible with the
insiders selling behavior. Consequently, prices at date 1 are never high enough to entice an insider
to sell shares after receiving good news. In short, as the market does not observe earnings at date
1, the market always assigns a strictly positive probability to failure, which encourages the insider
to keep the shares in the case of success.
Let b 2 [0; 1] be the probability that an insider without liquidity needs sells shares to the
market after observing a failure, x1 = 0.9 For a given pair of equilibrium values (priv; b) ; we dene
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m (priv; b)  Pr (Liquidity needs j Sale). By Bayesrule, rational market beliefs imply that
m (priv; b) =
Pr (Sale j Liquidity needs) Pr (Liquidity needs)
Pr (Sale)
. (6)
The inputs for this formula are as follows. In an equilibrium in which the probability of choosing
project 2 is priv, the unconditional probability of selling shares to the market at date 1 is
Pr (Sale) =  (1  e) + b (1  + e) [priv (1  p) + (1  priv) (1  p)] : (7)
The rst term on the right-hand side is the probability that the insider has liquidity needs, in
which case the insider sells with probability 1. The second term is given by the probability of no
liquidity needs (1  + e), times the probability of failure, times b, which is the probability of a
sale conditional on a failure and no liquidity needs.
Conditional on having liquidity needs, the insider sells to the market with probability 1. As the
probability of the insider experiencing liquidity needs is  (1  e), we have
m (priv; b) =
 (1  e)
 (1  e) + b (1  + e) [priv (1  p) + (1  priv) (1  p)]
. (8)
The equilibrium value of shares if the market holds rational beliefs is
Vpriv (priv; b) = m (priv; b) [privv2 + (1  priv) v1] + (1 m (priv; b)) p. (9)
If a public o¤ering is caused by liquidity needs, which happens with probability m (priv; b), the
market value per share is given by a weighted average of the fundamental values of the innovative
and the conventional projects, privv2+(1  priv) v1. If the public o¤ering is not caused by liquidity
needs, then by Lemma 1 the market knows that the insider does not sell shares after a success. As
the optimal action after a failure is to switch to the conventional project, the value of the rm after
a failure is p.
A necessary condition for the insider to sell shares to the market after a failure is Vpriv (priv; b) 
p. The next lemma shows that the insider always sells to the market after a failure.
Lemma 2. In the private ownership case, an insider without liquidity needs sells shares to the
market at date 1 with probability b = 1 after observing a failure (x1 = 0).
The insider always sells after a failure because the market assigns a strictly positive probability
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to x1 = 1. This belief is rational because an insider with liquidity needs always sells.
Lemma 2 shows that a key aspect of the private ownership case is the insiders ability to sell
shares at date 1 after observing a failure. A late-consumer insider only sells shares at date 1 if
they are overvalued. Overvaluation may occur in equilibrium because the market does not observe
x1 and thus cannot distinguish between a liquidity-motivated sale and an opportunistic sale. This
information asymmetry creates a valuable option for a late-consumer insider.
Let T (priv)  Vpriv (priv; 1)   p denote the intrinsic value of the option to exit early for a
late-consumer insider conditional on x1 = 0. Selling shares is a real option to the insider. The
value of the underlying asset is the market value of shares in equilibrium Vpriv, whereas the exercise
price of the option is p. Lemma 2 implies that T (priv) > 0.
3.2 Project choice at date 0
Now we return to date 0 and analyze the choice between projects 1 and 2. Suppose that the market
expects project 2 to be chosen with probability priv. At date 0, the expected value of each share
held by the insider if the insider chooses project 1 is given by
upriv;1   (1  e)Vpriv (priv; 1) + (1  + e) [(1  p)Vpriv (priv; 1) + p (1 + p)] . (10)
This expression accounts for the fact that at date 0 the insider does not yet know his type. With
probability  (1  e), the insider has liquidity needs and will be forced to sell at date 1. With
probability 1  + e, the insider has no liquidity needs but may sell voluntarily. Lemmas 1 and
2 imply that the insider sells after a failure and does not sell after a success.
Similarly, if the insider chooses project 2, whereas the market expects project 2 to be chosen
with probability priv, the expected value of each share at date 0 is
upriv;2   (1  e)Vpriv (priv; 1) + (1  + e) [(1  p)Vpriv (priv; 1) + p (1 + p)] . (11)
An equilibrium with a positive probability of exploration, priv > 0, exists only if upriv;2 
upriv;1. That is, choosing project 2 at date 0 must be incentive compatible for the insider. Using
upriv;2 and upriv;1, and substituting Vpriv (priv; 1) = T (priv) + p, we obtain
upriv;2  upriv;1 , v2   v1 + p(1  )T (priv)  0. (12)
19
An equilibrium in which the insider chooses project 2 with probability priv > 0 exists only if the
incentive compatibility condition (12) holds. Similarly, an equilibrium with a positive probability
of choosing project 1, priv < 1, exists only if v2   v1 + p(1   )T (priv)  0. A strictly mixed
strategy equilibrium, 0 < priv < 1, exists only if condition (12) holds with equality.
The intuition for the incentive e¤ects of private ownership on innovation can be obtained from
the incentive compatibility condition (12). Using Hirshleifers (1971) terminology, we call v2 v1 the
technological benet of innovation. It is the expected fundamental value of innovation, v2, minus
its opportunity cost, v1. The technological benet can be positive or negative. p (1  )T (priv)
is the pecuniary benet of innovation. It represents the net expected gain to the insider from the
option to trade on the basis of private information. Unlike the technological benet, the pecuniary
benet is always positive:
p (1  )T (priv) = (1  p)T (priv)  (1  p)T (priv) > 0. (13)
Because the innovative project has a higher probability of failure than does the conventional project,
the expected value of the option to exit early is higher under innovation, (1   p)T (priv) >
(1  p)T (priv).
The value of the option to exit early T (priv) reects the fact that the private ownership
structure displays a high degree of tolerance for failure. Tolerance for failure has been shown to
be a key feature of optimal incentive schemes for innovation (Manso 2011). Here, in contrast, the
incentive to innovate is given by the ownership structure itself. The key insight of our model is that
tolerance for failure is more valuable for innovation because the option to exit early is exercised more
often if exploration is chosen. To emphasize the underlying mechanism, we refer to the pecuniary
benet, p (1  )T (priv), as the tolerance-for-failure e¤ect.
The option to exit early pushes the insider towards choosing the innovative project. If innovation
is e¢ cient from a technological perspective (v2   v1  0), this extra incentive for innovation is not
necessary; the incentive compatibility condition is not binding. The case of negative technological
benets (v2   v1 < 0) is more surprising. In this case, innovation is ine¢ cient. We would then
have priv = 0 without the tolerance-for-failure e¤ect. However, because of the tolerance-for-
failure e¤ect, we can have priv > 0 or even 

priv = 1. Innovation may be chosen with certainty,
despite being ine¢ cient. If the tolerance-for-failure e¤ect is larger than the technological benet of
innovation, the private ownership structure ine¢ ciently encourages innovation.
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The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium value of priv under all possible pure strategy
and mixed strategy equilibria. In particular, we show that there is a unique priv for a given set
of parameters (p; ; ; ; e). The proposition follows from the incentive compatibility condition (12)
and the properties of T (priv).
Proposition 1. For each set of parameters (p; ; ; ; e), there exists a unique equilibrium proba-
bility of exploration for the private ownership case, priv 2 [0; 1], such that
1. if v2  v1, then priv = 1 (exploration is certain if innovation is e¢ cient);
2. if v2 < v1, then
priv =
8>>><>>>:
1, if v1 v2p(1 )  T (1) ,
 is such that T () = v1 v2p(1 ) , if T (1) <
v1 v2
p(1 ) < T (0) ,
0, if T (0)  v1 v2p(1 ) ,
(14)
where T (priv)  Vpriv (priv;1)  p.
Figure 3 shows the three possible cases if v2 < v1. The horizontal dashed lines represent di¤erent
values for v1 v2p(1 ) . Consider, e.g., decreasing v1   v2 and at the same time keeping p (1  ) xed
(this can be achieved by increasing ). The R1 line represents a case in which the di¤erence v1  v2
is large. In such a case, the technological benet of innovation is large and dominates the tolerance-
for-failure e¤ect, which implies that the rst-best action, priv = 0, is chosen in equilibrium. The
R2 line represents an intermediate value of v1 v2. In this case, there is a probability of innovation,
priv 2 (0; 1), that makes the insider indi¤erent between projects 1 and 2. The technological benet
is exactly o¤set by the tolerance-for-failure e¤ect. Thus, the equilibrium involves some ine¢ cient
amount of innovation. Figure 3 also shows that priv increases if the probability of the shock, ,
increases. This is so because T (priv) increases with  (Proposition 2 below proves this result).
The R3 line is a case in which v1   v2 is positive but small so that the option to exit early is so
valuable that the insider chooses the least protable project in equilibrium, priv = 1.
 Figure 3 about here 
In sum, our model shows that the private ownership structure is biased towards innovation.
This bias is welcome if v2  v1 but may lead to ine¢ ciencies if v1 > v2.
The e¤ects of , , e, and  on the intensity of innovation priv are described in Proposition
2. If v2   v1  0, then priv = 1. In this case, small changes in the parameters do not a¤ect the
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equilibrium. Therefore, Proposition 2 focuses on the case priv 2 (0; 1), for which v2  v1 < 0. This
is case R2 in Figure 3.






@ > 0, and
@priv
@e < 0.
Increases in  and  increase the net present value of innovation. Thus, the equilibrium intensity
of innovation increases. This proposition also shows that the radicalism of an innovation has
ambiguous e¤ects on the likelihood of its adoption. If an innovative project becomes more radical
because it is less likely to pay o¤, i.e., if  decreases, then the rm is less likely to innovate. If an
innovative project becomes more radical because its payo¤s increase more dramatically in the case
of success, i.e., if  increases, then the rm is more likely to innovate.
An increase in  helps the insider to disguise a trade after x1 = 0 as a sale motivated by
a liquidity shock. As a result, innovation becomes more attractive, and in equilibrium there is
more innovation. An increase in e, however, means that the insider can more easily nd a private
buyer in the case of a liquidity shock. A public sale then becomes less likely to be caused by a
liquidity shock. Thus, the IPO share price falls after an increase in e. Such an e¤ect attenuates
the tolerance-for-failure e¤ect, which then reduces the intensity of innovation.
3.3 The value of being private
We now calculate the expected value of the rm to the insider at t = 0, immediately after raising
capital from private investors to pay for the initial investment cost I. Let priv be the fraction
of shares that the insider retains after raising capital. Let upriv  privupriv;2 + (1   priv)upriv;1
denote the expected value of each share retained by the insider. We have the following lemma
Lemma 3. For any equilibrium value of priv, we have that upriv = 

privv2 + (1  priv)v1:
The intuition behind this lemma is as follows. Although the insider sells strategically at date 1
to exploit his informational advantage, share prices at date 1 must adjust until investors make zero
prots on average. Whatever the insider gains by trading strategically is perfectly compensated in
expectation by the loss that occurs when he is forced to liquidate his shares after a success. Thus,
at date 0, he expects, on average, zero prots from future trading.
Because we assumed that private investors may su¤er a liquidity shock that is perfectly cor-
related with that of the insider, private investors also value shares at upriv. Assuming as be-
fore that the insider has full bargaining power with respect to investors, the insider can sell
each share for upriv. To cover the investment cost, the revenue from selling shares must satisfy
(1  priv) cprivupriv  I. Because of the trading costs implied by cpriv < 1, the insider will sell the
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minimum number of shares necessary for the investment. That is, priv is such that
(1  priv) cprivupriv = I. (15)
To avoid uninteresting cases in which the investment can never be nanced, let I 2 (0; cprivminfv1,
v2g). That is, the rms cost of capital is su¢ ciently low, and funds for investment can always be





privv2 + (1  priv)v1
i : (16)
We can thus express the value of the rm to the insider under private ownership as




The rst two terms on the right-hand side represent the expected outcome from the project
decision, and the third term is the initial investment cost, adjusted for the cost of raising private
capital. One reason that Wpriv di¤ers from its rst-best counterpart the value of the rm in
a frictionless economy is because raising funds for investing is costly, cpriv < 1. Moreover, a
surprising result is thatWpriv may also di¤er from its rst-best counterpart because the equilibrium
level of innovation, priv, may be excessive compared with the rst best. That is, we can have
priv > 0 even though v1 > v2. The intuition here is the same as in Hirshleifer (1971). That is,
an agent may innovate too much to create opportunities for trading. The opposite problem never
occurs; under private ownership, there is never too little innovation in equilibrium.
4. Public Ownership
Now consider the case of public ownership. In this case, the insider pays for the investment cost,
I, by selling a fraction 1   pub of the shares to the public market. As in the case of private
ownership, the insider sells the remaining shares at date 1 if there is a liquidity shock. As before, if
sophisticated private buyers are available, which occurs with probability e, the insider may prefer
to sell shares to them. The di¤erence between the public and private cases is the transparency of
earnings. In the case of public ownership, the earnings, x1, can be observed by all investors.
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4.1 Selling behavior at date 1
The steps to analyze the equilibrium are similar to those in the case of private ownership. In what
follows, we denote the probability that the insider chooses project 2 by pub 2 [0; 1].
Earnings transparency means that the market always knows whether the rm has experienced
a failure, x1 = 0. The market also knows that project 1 is always chosen after x1 = 0. Therefore,
although the market does not know which project was chosen at date 0, this lack of knowledge is
not relevant for computing the value of the rm conditional on x1 = 0. Regardless of the project
chosen, the expected market value of the rm after x1 = 0 is p because there is no information
asymmetry between the insider and the market. Thus, shares are always fairly valued if x1 = 0 and
the insider gains nothing by selling shares. We can assume that the insider either sells or retains
his shares if x1 = 0. The equilibrium payo¤s are not a¤ected by this choice.
The insider may, however, choose to sell shares to the market after a success, x1 = 1. Although
the market knows that x1 = 1, the market does not know which project was chosen at date 0. If
project 1 was chosen, the expected value of the rm is 1+ p. If project 2 was chosen, the expected
value of the rm is 1 + p. Thus, the insider is better o¤ if the market believes that project 2 was
initially chosen. This creates a value-relevant information asymmetry.
The next lemma characterizes the behavior of an insider without liquidity needs after x1 = 1.
Lemma 4. In the public ownership case, after observing a success, x1 = 1, an insider without
liquidity needs
1. never sells shares to the market if the innovative project has been chosen;
2. weakly prefers to sell shares to the market if the conventional project has been chosen.
According to part 1 of Lemma 4, the insider never sells to the market voluntarily at date 1
after exploration. The intuition is that, if project 2 is chosen, the rm is sold with a discount after
x1 = 1 because the market can never be certain that project 2 was chosen.
According to part 2 of Lemma 4, the insider sells to the market with probability 1 if the insider
chooses the conventional project and is successful (to simplify the exposition, we assume that the
insider sells in the case of indi¤erence). Selling after x1 = 1 if the insider chooses project 1 is always
protable as long as the market assigns a strictly positive probability to project 2.
It is instructive to compare this case to the private ownership case. Under private ownership,
the insider never voluntarily sells to the market after a success. The reason for the di¤erence in
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behavior is that outsiders can observe successes in the case of a public rm but not in the case of
a private rm. In the private case, a rm may have had a success, but the market always assigns a
positive probability to failure. As a result, selling to the market after a success is never optimal. In
the public case, the market can observe successes but still cannot observe which project was chosen.
Thus, under public ownership, it is optimal to sell after a success if the conventional project was
chosen.
Lemma 4 implies that, if there was no liquidity shock, trading after x1 = 1 would reveal the
choice of project. Liquidity shocks allow insiders who choose project 1 to trade after x1 = 1 without
revealing the choice of project. In equilibrium, late-consumer insiders who have chosen project 1
pool with early-consumer insiders.
In equilibrium, the market must have correct beliefs and thus must assign probability pub to
the likelihood of project 2 being chosen. If the market observes a success and the insider sells
shares, the market assigns probability s to project 2 being chosen. The di¤erence between pub and
s is that pub is the unconditional probability of choosing project 2, whereas s is the probability of
project 2 being chosen given that the insider sells shares and the market observes x1 = 1,
s  Pr (Project 2 j Sale; x1 = 1) =
Pr(Sale; x1 = 1 j Project 2)Pr(Project 2)
Pr(Sale; x1 = 1)
. (18)
The values of the probabilities are as follows. From Lemma 4, the probability of selling and
x1 = 1 is
Pr(Sale; x1 = 1) = (1  pub) p+ pub (1  e) p, (19)
and the probability of selling and x1 = 1 conditional on project 2 is
Pr(Sale; x1 = 1 j Project 2) =  (1  e) p. (20)
Finally, the unconditional probability of project 2 is pub. Therefore, equilibrium beliefs must be
s(pub) =
pub (1  e) 
(1  pub) + pub (1  e) 
. (21)
Given such beliefs, the market value of shares sold in public markets at t = 1 after a success is
Vpub (pub) = 1 + s (pub) p+ [1  s (pub)] p. (22)
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4.2 Project choice at date 0
We determine which project is chosen at date zero by rst calculating the expected payo¤s of
projects 1 and 2 for the insider. The expected value of one share if the insider chooses project 1 is
upub;1 = pVpub (pub) + (1  p) p. (23)
If the insider chooses project 1, the probability of success is p. In the case of a success, the insider
sells to the market and obtains Vpub (pub). If there is a failure, the market value of the rm becomes
p, because the best project to choose at date 1 is project 1, again with probability p of success.
The expected gain per share from choosing project 2 is
upub;2 = p [ (1  e)Vpub (pub) + (1  + e) (1 + p)] + (1  p) p. (24)
At date 1, the probability of success is p. In the case of a success, the insider only sells to the
market if he has liquidity needs, which occurs with probability  (1  e). Without liquidity needs,
the insider retains the shares until date 2 and continues with project 2, now with a probability
of success equal to p. If x1 = 0, which occurs with probability (1  p), the insider obtains p,
regardless of whether the insider retains the shares or sells them.
The next proposition fully characterizes the equilibrium pub for all mixed strategy and pure
strategy equilibria. For a given set of parameters, the equilibrium pub is unique.
Proposition 3. For each set of parameters (p; ; ; ; e), there exists a unique equilibrium proba-
bility of exploration for the public ownership case, pub 2 [0; 1), given by
pub =
s




v2   v1    (1  e) p2 (   1)
p2 (   1) [1   (1  e)] ; 0

. (26)
Moreover, pub is such that
1. if v1  v2  (1  e) p2 (   1), then pub = 0 (in particular, exploitation is certain if v1 > v2);
2. if v1 < v2    (1  e) p2 (   1), then pub 2 (0; 1).
Proposition 3 shows that an equilibrium with full innovation, pub = 1, is never possible. If
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the market expects exploration with probability 1, then choosing exploitation becomes a dominant
strategy. By choosing project 1, the insider increases the probability of success and if successful,
makes a prot by selling shares at date 1.
The proposition also shows that under public ownership the insider chooses project 1 if v1 > v2.
This contrasts with the case of private ownership, in which the insider may choose the innovative
project even if the conventional project has a higher expected return. However, if v2 > v1, the
insider never chooses to explore with probability 1 under public ownership. In fact, the insider may
choose project 1 with probability 1 even though v2 > v1. These results show that public ownership
creates a bias against innovation. However, public ownership always induces the e¢ cient project
choice if v1 > v2.
Proposition 4 shows the e¤ects of , , , and e on pub. If v1  v2, then pub = 0. Therefore,
the proposition focuses on the case pub 2 (0; 1), for which v2 > v1.






@ < 0, and
@pub
@e > 0.
Parameter  increases the probability of success at t = 1, and  increases the probability of
success at t = 2; given that the project was successful at t = 1. Because the innovative project
becomes more valuable as  or  increase, an increase in one of these parameters makes innovation
more likely, i.e., pub increases. As in the case of private ownership, the radicalism of an innovation
has ambiguous e¤ects on project choice.
Innovation becomes less likely after an increase in the probability of a liquidity shock, @pub=@ <
0. Recall that Proposition 4 only considers the case in which v2 > v1, which implies pub 2 (0; 1).
Therefore, pub < 1 means that the insider chooses the conventional project with positive prob-
ability, although the conventional project is ine¢ cient. The insider behaves in this way because
the probability of success at t = 1 under the conventional project is higher than the probability of
success under the innovative project, p > p. If liquidity shocks occur frequently, the insider can
more easily hide the choice of project 1. Frequent liquidity shocks make the market more likely to
believe that the insider is selling because of a liquidity shock and not because of a success under
exploitation. Thus, as it becomes easier to hide the choice of project 1, the incentives to choose
innovation are reduced.10
Unlike the case of private ownership, under public ownership innovation becomes more likely
as nding informed private buyers becomes easier (@pub=@e > 0). This result suggests that a well-
developed buyout market is benecial for innovation in public rms. The intuition is as follows.
Insiders with liquidity needs at date 1 may have to sell undervalued shares if they innovate and are
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successful. This possibility makes the innovative project less attractive. If sophisticated private
buyers are willing to buy the insider out after a success, then the incentives for innovation are
restored.
4.3 The value of being public
We now compute the expected value of the rm to the insider at t = 0, immediately after raising
capital from public investors to pay for the initial investment cost I. Let pub be the fraction of
shares that the insider retains after raising capital. Let upub  pubupub;2 + (1  pub)upub;1 denote
the expected value of each share retained by the insider. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For any equilibrium value of pub, we have that upub = 

pubv2 + (1  pub)v1:
As in the private case, share prices at date 1 adjust until investors make zero prots on average.
To cover the investment cost, the revenue from selling shares must satisfy (1  pub) cpubupub 
I. Because of the trading costs implied by cpub < 1, the insider will sell the minimum number of
shares necessary for the investment. That is, pub is such that
(1  pub) cpubupub = I: (27)





pubv2 + (1  pub)v1
i : (28)
We can thus express the value of the rm to the insider under public ownership as




The ex ante value of the public rm di¤ers from the value of the private rm for two reasons.
First, the costs of public and private capital may di¤er (cpriv 6= cpub). Second, the intensities of
innovation under public and private ownership may di¤er (priv 6= pub).
5. The Decision to Go Public or Private
We now complete the characterization of the equilibrium by considering the decision ' 2 fpriv; pubg.
The decision to go private or public at date 0 depends only on the values of Wpriv and Wpub. If
28
Wpriv > Wpub, the insider chooses to go private. If Wpub > Wpriv, the insider chooses to go public.










If public o¤erings are cheaper than private o¤erings (cpub > cpriv), then a > 0.














which proves Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. For a given set of parameters (p; ; ; ; e; cpriv; c pub; I), the private ownership




(v2   v1)  aI, (32)
where priv and 

pub are given by Propositions 1 and 3.
From Proposition 5, we see that the choice between public and private structures is driven by
three key forces: (1) the di¤erence in innovation intensity between private and public structures,
priv   pub, (2) the relative e¢ ciency of innovative projects, v2   v1, and (3) the relative capital
cost advantage of public o¤erings, aI.
We use the results from the two previous sections to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6. For any (p; ; ; ; e) ; priv   pub  0. That is, the intensity of innovation under
private ownership is at least as large as the intensity of innovation under public ownership.
This result follows from the fact that the private structure sometimes creates a bias towards
innovation (tolerance for failure), whereas the public structure sometimes creates a bias against
innovation (short-termism). These biases distort innovation away from its rst-best level but in
di¤erent directions. For a given set of parameters, one of the two following cases must hold: either
there are no biases or at least one structure has a bias that distorts innovation. If biases are not
present, then both structures lead to the same intensity of innovation. If at least one of these biases
is operational, then there is either too much innovation under the private structure or too little
innovation under the public structure. In either case, we have priv  pub.
This result has important empirical consequences. It formally shows that private rms are more
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innovative than are public rms, holding all else constant. This result is also important because
it implies that, apart from di¤erences in the cost of capital, going private is more attractive than
going public if innovation is e¢ cient (v2  v1 > 0). In fact, if we shut down the e¤ect of the cost of
capital by setting a = 0, innovation e¢ ciency is the only consideration in the choice of ownership
structure, as shown in the next corollary.
Corollary 1. Let a = 0 so that the private ownership structure is preferable to the public ownership
structure if and only if (priv   pub) (v2   v1)  0 for a given set of parameters (p; ; ; ; e). Then
1. if innovation is e¢ cient (v2 > v1), the insider chooses to go private;
2. if the conventional project is e¢ cient (v1 > v2), the insider strictly prefers to go public if
v1 v2
p(1 ) < T (0) and is indi¤erent between going public or private if
v1 v2
p(1 )  T (0);
3. if both projects are equivalent (v2 = v1), the insider is indi¤erent between going public or
private.
If v2 > v1, then Propositions 1 and 3 imply priv = 1 and 

pub < 1. Therefore, the condition
for going private is satised. If v1 > v2; then Proposition 3 implies pub = 0. The corollary above
implies that the insider will either choose to go public or may choose to go private if v1 v2p(1 )  T (0).
In the latter case, Proposition 1 implies that priv = 0: Thus, if the insider optimally chooses the
ownership structure, the rst-best outcome is always achieved. The innovative project is chosen
with probability 1 if v2 > v1, and the conventional project is chosen with probability 1 if v1 > v2.
6. Illiquid Private Securities
As discussed in Subsection 2.5, private securities are probably more di¢ cult to sell than public
securities. To capture the relative illiquidity of private securities, we now assume that, if the rm is
private, the insider only pockets k < 1 for each dollar of shares sold at date 1. Because the algebra
is substantially more complex in this case, without loss of generality, we set e = 0.
The analysis of the public case is unchanged. Most of the analysis of the private case also
remains unchanged. In particular, Lemma 1 still holds. Therefore, an insider without liquidity
needs never sells shares to the market after x1 = 1. However, with k < 1, the necessary condition
for selling shares to the market after a failure changes to
kVpriv (priv; b)  p. (33)
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Because Vpriv (priv; b) > p, we have kVpriv (priv; b) > p for k su¢ ciently close to 1. As a result,
the insider sells shares with probability 1 after a failure if the market for private securities is liquid
enough. As k approaches 1, we eventually get b = 1. On the other hand, if the market at date 1
is very illiquid (k close to zero), then a late-consumer insider never sells, b = 0. For intermediate
values of k, the equilibrium is in strictly mixed strategies, with b 2 (0; 1) and b increasing in k. The
next lemma formalizes these results.
Lemma 6. In the private ownership case with k 2 (0; 1] and e = 0, a late-consumer insider sells
shares with equilibrium probability b (priv) at date 1 after observing x1 = 0, where
b (priv) =
8>>><>>>:
1, if k  k1,

k[v1+priv(v2 v1)] p
(1 k)(1 )[1 p+privp(1 )]p , if k2 < k < k1,
0, if k  k2,
(34)
k1 
p+ (1  ) [1  p+ privp (1  )] p




v1 + priv (v2   v1)
.
The threshold values k1 and k2 dene three regions for the behavior of the insider, as shown in
Figure 4. In Region 3, the insider never sells shares. In Region 2, the insider plays a strictly mixed
strategy. If the market for private securities is liquid enough, k  k1, as shown in Region 1, then
the insider sells after a failure with probability 1.
 Figure 4 about here 
Figure 4 also illustrates the e¤ect of the liquidity shock on the insiders selling behavior. If 
increases, k1 decreases. So, a late-consumer insider sells shares with probability 1 for a larger set of
values of k. Intuitively, if  increases, it becomes easier for the insider to disguise a failure behind
a liquidity shock.
We redene T (the intrinsic value of the option to exit early for a late-consumer insider) as
T (priv)  max fkVpriv (priv; b (priv))  p; 0g . (35)
This option has zero value if the underlying value kVpriv (priv; b (priv)) is low, which may happen
either because the market for private securities is very illiquid (low k) or because the market is
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cold, i.e., the market believes that x1 = 0 is very likely if an insider sells shares (that is,  is
low). In Figure 4, T (priv) is strictly positive in Region 1, and zero in Regions 2 and 3.
The next proposition generalizes our results in Proposition 1 to the case in which k  1.
Proposition 7. For each set of parameters (p; ; ; ; k) and e = 0, there exists an equilibrium
probability of exploration for the private ownership case, priv 2 [0; 1], given by
1. if v2 > v1, then priv = 1 (exploration is certain if innovation is e¢ cient);
2. if v2 < v1, then
priv =
8>>><>>>:
1, if v1 v2p(1 )  T (1) ,
 such that T () = v1 v2p(1 ) , if T (1) <
v1 v2
p(1 ) < T (0) ,
0, if T (0)  v1 v2p(1 ) ;
(36)
where T (priv)  max fkVpriv (priv; b (priv))  p; 0g.
3. if v2 = v1, then priv 2 argmin2[0;1] T ().
The private ownership innovation bias is still present in this case. We can have priv = 1
with v1 > v2 and k < 1. That is, the insider may choose the innovative project with certainty
even though the conventional project is the e¢ cient choice and the market for private securities is
illiquid.
Starting from an equilibrium with priv = 1 and v1 > v2, as k falls the insider eventually
chooses a mixed strategy between the innovative and the conventional project (0 < priv < 1).
As k continues to decrease, the insider eventually selects the conventional project with certainty
(priv = 0). If v1 = v2, the insider may be indi¤erent among several strategies and we can have
multiple probabilities priv in equilibrium. If v2 > v1, the insider always selects the innovative
project with certainty (priv = 1) for any k.
As before, the insider chooses to go private or public to maximize the ex ante value of the rm.
The value of Wpub is unchanged, Wpub = upub   Icpub . In the private case, on the other hand, the
value of the rm must now take into account the discount implied by k < 1.
Lemma 7. For each set of parameters (p; ; ; ; k) and e = 0, the ex ante value of each share to

















































if k  k2
:
The new term L (k) represents the expected cost of illiquidity associated with the sale of shares
at date 1. This cost is another source of ine¢ ciency associated with private ownership. Selling
shares is costly because private securities are illiquid. Simple inspection reveals that L (k) > 0
(recall that  > 0), unless k = 1, in which case L (1) = 0.
The illiquidity cost L(k) a¤ects the choice between public and private ownership structures.




(v2   v1)  aI + L(k), (38)
where a is as dened in Equation (30). If cpriv = cpub (a = 0), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Let k  1. If cpriv = cpub, then
1. if v1  v2, the insider chooses the public structure;
2. if v2 > v1, there is a unique k 2 (0; 1) such that the insider chooses the public structure if
k < k and chooses the private structure if k  k.
If private securities are less liquid than public securities (k < 1), the insider faces a trade-o¤ if
v2 > v1. The trade o¤ shows up because the private structure provides appropriate incentives to
innovate but imposes illiquidity costs. If the illiquidity costs are large (k small), the insider prefers
the public structure even though it leads to less innovation. If we think of k as representing the
costs of selling some shares of an originally private company, such as the IPO costs, our model
suggests that innovation is fostered by the development of IPO markets (i.e., an increase in k).
7. Model Implications
Our model has a number of new empirical implications. Here we briey discuss some of the key
predictions and the existing empirical evidence. This section also serves as a summary of the main
results in the article.
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Prediction 1. Firms undertake more innovative projects after going private.
Prediction 2. Firms undertake fewer innovative projects after going public.
Both predictions follow from Proposition 6. As discussed in the introduction, the evidence in
Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2011) is consistent with (but not a direct test of) Prediction 1.
Recent work by Bernstein (2011) aims at explicitly testing Prediction 2. In a data set of innovative
rms that led for an IPO, he compares the innovation performance of rms that successfully com-
pleted their IPOs with those that decided to withdraw the IPO for exogenous reasons. Consistent
with Prediction 2, he nds that rms that proceed with their IPOs experience a decline in patent
citations and other innovation measures.
Prediction 3. Firms should go or stay private if innovative projects have higher net present values
than do conventional projects. Similarly, rms should go or stay public if conventional projects
have higher net present values than do innovative projects.
This is a direct consequence of Corollary 1 (i.e., it is also a corollary of predictions 1 and 2).
Holding all else constant, the relative protability of innovative versus conventional projects should
a¤ect the decision to go public or private. We are unaware of empirical work directly testing this
prediction.
Prediction 4. A reduction in the costs of an IPO fosters innovation.
This prediction follows from Proposition 8. An IPO becomes less costly as k increases. If
k  k and innovation is e¢ cient, rms optimally choose the private structure, which leads to more
innovation. An empirical consequence of this prediction is that countries with more developed IPO
markets (high k) should have more innovative rms.
Prediction 5. An active buyout market fosters innovation in public rms but harms innovation
in private rms.
This prediction follows from Propositions 2 and 4. In a more developed buyout market, sophis-
ticated private equity investors (buyout and VC) are more easily available to provide liquidity to
managers and entrepreneurs. In our model, this corresponds to an increase in e. From Proposition
2, an increase in e harms innovation in private rms. From Proposition 4, an increase in e fosters
innovation in public rms.
Prediction 6. An increase in the degree of information asymmetry in IPOs fosters innovation in
private rms.
This prediction follows from Proposition 2. In the case of a private rm, parameter  can be
seen as a proxy for an information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors. If  = 0,
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insiders cannot benet from IPO timing, as IPO prices become fully informative about date 1
earnings. If  = 1, IPO prices contain no information about earnings. Proposition 2 shows that
innovation increases with . Intuitively, more asymmetric information makes the option to sell after
a failure more valuable, which strengthens the tolerance-for-failure e¤ect, thus fostering innovation
in private rms.
Prediction 7. A decrease in stock liquidity fosters innovation in public rms.
This prediction follows from Proposition 4. In the case of a public rm, there is no asymmetry
of information concerning x1 at date 1. Parameter  is proportional to the price impact of an
insider trade. A small  implies a large price decline if the insider sells. Thus, larger values of  are
associated with smaller price declines due to insider trading, which is equivalent to a more liquid
market for the stock. Proposition 4 shows that an increase in liquidity (larger ) hurts innovation
in public rms. The evidence in Fang, Tian, and Rice (2010) supports this prediction. They nd
that exogenous increases in stock liquidity adversely a¤ect innovation. Such an e¤ect is stronger for
rms in which managers are more likely to yield to pressure to maximize short-term stock prices,
which is consistent with the mechanism behind Prediction 7.
Although most of the direct predictions of the model still need to be tested, there is some addi-
tional evidence in support of the forces underlying our model. Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist
(2011) investigate the e¤ects of public and private ownership on corporate investment. They nd
that public rms invest less than similar private rms and that rms reduce their investment levels
after going public. They argue that their evidence is best explained by managerial short-termism,
as in Stein (1989). In particular, they show that there are no signicant di¤erences in investment
behavior when comparing private rms with public rms in which prices are less sensitive to ac-
counting earnings. This evidence is consistent with our assumption that the key di¤erence between
private and public companies is the information contained in earnings. In our model, a public
company with uninformative earnings would invest in the same way as a private company.
Evidence consistent with the tolerance-for-failure e¤ect is provided by Acharya and Subra-
manian (2009), who empirically demonstrate that innovation is more prevalent in countries with
debtor-friendly bankruptcy codes, and Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2009), who show that
more stringent labor laws lead to more innovation inside rms. Similarly, Chemmanur and Tian
(2011) show that rms generate more and better patents after the adoption of antitakeover provi-
sions. They argue that antitakeover provisions make rms more tolerant of short-run failures and
allow them to focus on long-run projects. Tian and Wang (2011) develop a measure of failure-
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tolerance for venture capitalists and show that IPO rms that are backed by failure-tolerant VCs
are more innovative. Chemmanur, Loutskinna, and Tian (2011) provide related evidence that VCs
create value for their portfolio rms partly because they exhibit tolerance for failures, which spurs
innovation.
8. Final Remarks
Our results suggest that public and private rms invest in fundamentally di¤erent ways. Private
rms take more risks, invest more in new products and technologies, and pursue more radical
innovations. Private rms are more likely to choose projects that are complex, di¢ cult to describe,
and untested. Organizational change is also more likely under private ownership. Mergers and
acquisitions, divestitures, and changes in organizational structure and management practices are
more easily motivated under private ownership.
Conversely, public rms choose more conventional projects. Their managers appear short-
sighted; they care too much about current earnings. They nd it di¢ cult to pursue complex
projects that the market does not appear to understand well. Public rms go private after adverse
shocks, when it is clear that their business models are no longer working and there is a need for
restructuring.
There are still many untested implications of our model. Our model predicts that cash-ow
volatility should be higher in private rms. Private rms should be more protable during techno-
logical revolutions, whereas public rms should be more valuable in mature but growing industries.
Our model also has implications for the decision to go public or private. Firms are likely to go
public after a technological breakthrough, i.e., when it makes sense to exploit a newly discovered
technology. Firms are likely to go private after su¤ering permanent negative productivity shocks,
i.e., when their existing technologies or business models become permanently unprotable. Chem-
manur, He, and Nandy (2010) nd that rms go public at the peak of their productivity, and then
performance declines after going public. This is consistent with rms going public only after per-
fecting a new technology; they become public in the harvestingperiod. Our model also explains
why companies go private when performance is particularly poor.
Finally, we note that there are many directions in which the model can be extended. Our
model emphasizes two important e¤ects short-termism and the lack of tolerance for failures
that make public rms ill-suited to pursue innovations. However, one could also argue, along the
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lines of Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), that the hands-o¤approach of public shareholders
is necessary to foster managerial initiative and may counteract the e¤ects we emphasize here. This
is a promising avenue for future theoretical and empirical explorations.
Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1.
Proof. Let bF  Pr (Sale j x1 = 0) denote the probability of selling shares to the market after
a failure and bS  Pr (Sale j x1 = 1) denote the probability of selling shares to the market after a
success, both for the case of no liquidity needs. Let h denote the probability that the project failed,
given that the insider sell shares to the market, h  Pr (x1 = 0 j Sale). To prove that bS = 0, we
rst need to prove two preliminary results.
Result 1: bF  bS . Proof: Let V be the market value of shares at date 1. The insider sells
shares at date 1 after a success with project 1 only if V  1 + p. Similarly, the insider sells shares
at date 1 after a success with project 2 only if V  1 + p. After a failure, the insider sells only if
V  p, regardless of the project chosen. Thus, in any equilibrium such that bS > 0, it must be that
V  min f1 + p; 1 + pg = 1 + p, which implies that V > p. In such a case, the insider must sell
with probability 1 after a failure, i.e., bF = 1. Therefore, the probability of selling to the market
after a failure must be at least as large as the probability of selling after a success, bF  bS .
Intuitively, this result follows from the fact that the condition to sell in case of success is more
stringent than the condition to sell in case of failure.
Result 2: h  1   p. Proof: By denition, Pr (Sale) = bF Pr (x1 = 0) + bS (1  Pr (x1 = 0)).
Result 1 implies that Pr (Sale)  bF Pr (x1 = 0) + bF (1  Pr (x1 = 0)) = bF :
By Bayesrule,
h =
bF Pr (x1 = 0)
Pr (Sale)
: (A1)
Because bF  Pr (Sale), then h  Pr (x1 = 0). The lowest possible value for Pr (x1 = 0) occurs if
the insider chooses project 1 with probability 1, in which case Pr (x1 = 0) = 1   p, proving that
h  1  p:
Now, to prove that bS = 0, it su¢ ces to show that V < 1 + p always (because 1 + p <
1 + p). Let s denote the probability that the insider has chosen the innovative project given
that shares are sold to the market at date 1, s  Pr (Project 2 j Sale). In any equilibrium in
which the market has rational beliefs, each share sold at date 1 must be valued at V (s; h) 
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hp + (1  h) [s (1 + p) + (1  s) (1 + p)]. Notice that V (s; h) is increasing in s and decreasing in
h: Result 2 implies that h cannot be lower than 1   p; therefore the upper bound for V (s; h) is
given by V  V (1; 1  p) = (1  p) p+ p (1 + p).
A necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for the insider to sell shares to the market after a
success is that the maximum possible value for V must be at least as large as the minimum possible
value for the fundamental value of shares: V  min f1 + p; 1 + pg = 1+p. Because V is increasing
in , setting  = 1=p (the highest possible value of ) implies that this condition can expressed as
(1  p) p+ 2p  1 + p. It is straightforward to check that this condition never holds for any p < 1
(the case in which p = 1 is ruled out by assumption, as there would be no uncertainty). Thus,
there is no combination of parameters and rational market beliefs h and s such that V  1 + p,
which proves that bS = 0.
Lemma 2.
Proof. For any given pair of market beliefs (priv; b), an insider without liquidity needs sells
with probability 1 after a failure if Vpriv (priv; b) > p , m (priv; b) [privv2 + (1  priv) v1] +
(1 m (priv; b)) p > p. Because Pr (Liquidity needs) =  (1  e) > 0, from Equation (6) we have
that m (priv; b) > 0. Thus Vpriv (priv; b) > p holds for any (priv; b) because v1 > p and v2 > p.
Proposition 1.
Proof. The equilibrium value of priv must satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints
v2   v1 + p (1  )T (1)  0 if priv = 1 (project 2),
v2   v1 + p (1  )T (priv) = 0 if priv 2 (0; 1) (mixed strategies),
v2   v1 + p (1  )T (0)  0 if priv = 0 (project 1),
(A2)
where T (priv)  Vpriv (priv; 1)  p. We have T (priv) > 0 (see the proof of Lemma 2).
Case 1. If v2  v1  0, then the IC condition for project 2, v2  v1+ p (1  )T (1)  0, is trivially
satised as T (priv) > 0 for any priv. On the other hand, there is no priv such that the IC
conditions for project 1 or for mixed strategies can be satised. Therefore, priv = 1 is the only
equilibrium.






[privv2 + (1  priv) v1   p]  (v1   v2)m (priv; 1) < 0; (A3)
because @m(priv ;1)@priv < 0 and privv2 + (1  priv) v1   p > 0. Therefore, the value for the option to
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exit is minimized at priv = 1 and maximized at priv = 0.
If v1 v2p(1 )  T (1), then the IC condition for project 2 is satised for any priv, whereas there
is no priv < 1 such that the IC conditions for project 1 or for mixed strategies can be satised.
Therefore, priv = 1 is the only equilibrium.
If T (1) < v1 v2p(1 ) < T (0), as T (priv) is continuous and decreasing in priv 2 (0; 1), there
exists a unique priv 2 (0; 1) such that T (priv) = v1 v2p(1 ) . In this case, the IC condition for mixed
strategies holds exactly at priv and upriv;1 = upriv;2.
If T (0)  v1 v2p(1 ) ; then the IC condition for project 1 is satised for any priv, whereas there
is no priv > 0 such that the IC conditions for project 2 or for mixed strategies can be satised.
Therefore, priv = 0 is the only equilibrium.
Proposition 2.
Proof. Suppose that priv 2 (0; 1). In this case, the IC condition implies that priv is dened
implicitly by v2  v1+ p(1  )T (priv) = 0. Dene G(; ; ; ; e) = v2  v1+ p(1  )T (). Substi-
tuting T () = Vpriv(; 1) p implies G(; ; ; ; e) = v2 v1+p(1 )fm(; 1)[v2+(1  ) v1 p]g.







, where x is the parameter of interest
and @G@ < 0, as
@G(;;;;e)
@ = p(1   )f
@m
@ [v2 + (1  ) v1   p] + (v2   v1)m(; 1)g,
@m
@ < 0, and
v2   v1 < 0. We have
@G(priv ;;;;e)
@ = p(1   )[p
2 + p (1  )m(priv; 1)p2priv] > 0, which
implies
@priv
@ > 0. Moreover, after some algebra, it can be shown that
@G(priv ;;;;e)



















@e = p(1   )
@m
@e [p +
priv (v2   v1)] < 0, because @m@e < 0, which implies
@priv













Proof. The proof follows by algebra. To save on notation, we use  instead of priv. We have
upriv  upriv;2 + (1  )upriv;1; thus using the expressions for upriv;1 and upriv;2 we get
upriv =  (1  e)Vpriv (; 1) +
+ (1  + e) f[ (1  p) + (1  ) (1  p)]Vpriv (; 1) + p (1 + p) + (1  ) p (1 + p)g :
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Substituting (8) in (9) we get
Vpriv (; 1) =
 (1  e) [v2 + (1  ) v1] + (1  + e) [ (1  p) + (1  ) (1  p)] p
 (1  e) + (1  + e) [ (1  p) + (1  ) (1  p)] :
Substituting Vpriv (; 1) in the expression for upriv yields (after algebra)
upriv =  (1  e) [v2 + (1  ) v1] + (1  + e) [ (1  p) + (1  ) (1  p)] p+
+(1  + e) fp (1 + p) + (1  ) [p (1 + p)]g
=  (1  e) [v2 + (1  ) v1] + (1  + e) [v2 + (1  ) v1]
= v2 + (1  ) v1,
which completes the proof.
Lemma 4.
Proof. Part 1. Rational market beliefs imply that shares sold after x1 = 1 can be valued at
most at 1+p. Therefore, an insider without liquidity needs strictly prefers to keep his shares, unless
the market believes that pub = 1. However, pub = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. If the market
believes that pub = 1, then the insider would instead exploit (i.e., choose project 1 with probability
1), sell at date 1 in case of a success, and obtain an expected payo¤ p (1 + p) + (1  p) p >
p (1 + p) + (1  p) p. (Recall that the market observes x1 = 1 but cannot observe the project.)
Therefore, pub = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, if an equilibrium exists, it must be that
pub < 1. As pub < 1, the insider never sells after a success.
Part 2. Rational market beliefs imply that shares sold after x1 = 1 must be valued at least at
1 + p. An insider without liquidity needs then strictly prefers to sell his shares, unless the market
believes that pub = 0, in which case he is indi¤erent between selling or not selling.
Proposition 3.
Proof. For the insider to be willing to randomize between projects 1 and 2, we must have equal
expected gains from both projects, i.e.,
pVpub (pub) + (1  p) p = p [ (1  e)Vpub (pub) + (1  + e) (1 + p)] + (1  p) p. (A5)
The term on the left-hand side is the expected value of choosing project 1. This expression uses
the fact that the insider always sells to the market after x1 = 1 (Lemma 4, part 2). The term on
the right-hand side is the expected value of choosing project 2. This expression uses the fact that
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an insider without liquidity needs never sells to the market after x1 = 1 (Lemma 4, part 1).
Replacing Vpub (pub) with (22) and solving for s (pub) yields (after algebra)
s (pub) =
 [1 + p (   1)]   (1  e) p (   1)  1
p (   1) [1   (1  e)] =
v2   v1    (1  e) p2 (   1)
p2 (   1) [1   (1  e)] ; (A6)
as long as the numerator is positive. If negative, the equilibrium s (pub) is zero, because in that








v2   v1    (1  e) p2 (   1)
p2 (   1) [1   (1  e)] ; 0

: (A7)
Using (21), pub = s
=[ (1  e) + s (1   + e)] if s > 0, and pub = 0 if s = 0, thus there
is a one-to-one mapping between pub and s
.
If v1  v2  (1  e) p2 (   1), then from (A7) s = 0) pub = 0. If v1 < v2 (1 e)p2( 
1), then we must have pub 2 (0; 1).
Proposition 4.
Proof. From Proposition 3, pub is strictly increasing in s
 if pub 2 (0; 1). Therefore, we








x is the parameter of interest and
@pub










@e = (1   )
1+p( 1)
p( 1)[1 (1 e)]2 > 0 and
@s




Proof. The proof follows by algebra. To save on notation, we use  instead of pub. We have
upub  upub;2 + (1  )upub;1; thus using the expressions for upub;1 and upub;2 we get
upub = [(1  ) p+  (1  e) p]Vpub () (A8)
+(1  ) (1  p) p+  [p (1  + e) (1 + p) + (1  p) p] :
Substituting (21) in (22) we get
Vpub () = 1 + p+ s () (   1) p (A9)
=
(1  ) p(1 + p) +  (1  e) p (1 + p)
(1  ) p+  (1  e) p :
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Thus,
upub = [(1  ) p+  (1  e) p]
(1  ) p(1 + p) +  (1  e) p (1 + p)
(1  ) p+  (1  e) p (A10)
+(1  ) (1  p) p+  [p (1  + e) (1 + p) + (1  p) p]
= (1  ) 2p+  [p (1 + p) + (1  p) p]
= (1  ) v1 + v2;
which completes the proof.
Proposition 5.
Proof. From the expressions of Wpriv and Wpub in (17) and (29), we obtain Wpriv  Wpub ,
priv   pub

(v2   v1)  aI.
Proposition 6.
Proof. Suppose v2  v1. Then from Proposition 1, we have priv = 1, and from Proposition




pub if v2  v1. Suppose instead that v2 < v1.




Proof. By Proposition 5, if a = 0, the insider prefers the private ownership structure if
priv   pub

(v2   v1)  0. We need to consider three cases. (1) If v2 > v1, the condition reduces
to priv  pub. From Propositions 1 and 3, priv = 1 and pub < 1. Therefore, priv > pub and
the insider goes private. (2) If v1 > v2, then the condition to go private reduces to priv  pub.
By Proposition 1, priv > 0 if
v1 v2
p(1 ) < T (0) and 

priv = 0 if
v1 v2
p(1 )  T (0). By Proposition






p(1 ) < T (0) (the insider then goes public), and
priv = 

pub otherwise (the insider is then indi¤erent between going public or private). (3) If




(v2   v1) = 0 and the insider is indi¤erent between going public or
private.
Lemma 6.
Proof. From Vpriv (priv; b) = m (priv; b) [privv2 + (1  priv) v1] + (1 m) p and
m (priv; b) =





Vpriv (priv; b) =
 [v1 + priv (v2   v1)] + (1  ) [1  p+ privp (1  )] pb
+ (1  ) [1  p+ privp (1  )] b
. (A12)
We split the proof into three parts, for b = 1, b = 0, and 0 < b < 1.
(1) For b = 1 to be part of an optimal strategy for the insider, we need kVpriv (priv; 1)  p.
Substituting the expression of Vpriv (priv; 1), the condition for selling is
k  p+ (1  ) [1  p+ privp (1  )] p
 [v1 + priv (v2   v1)] + (1  ) [1  p+ privp (1  )] p
 k1. (A13)
Because v1 + priv (v2   v1) > p, k1 < 1. Thus, there exist values for k such that k > k1, in which
case b = 1 is the optimal action for the insider.
(2) For b = 0 to be part of an equilibrium strategy for the insider, we need kVpriv (priv; 0)  p.
Similar algebra shows that this condition is equivalent to
k  p
v1 + priv (v2   v1)
 k2, (A14)
where 0 < k2 < k1.
(3) If k 2 (k2; k1), any equilibrium must be in strictly mixed strategies. Imposing the condition
kV (priv; b) = p leads to
b = 
k [v1 + priv (v2   v1)]  p
(1  k) (1  ) [1  p+ privp (1  )] p
. (A15)
Substituting in (A15) shows that b = 0 if k = k2, and that b = 1 if k = k1. Furthermore, b is strictly
increasing in k, as @b@k = 
v1+(v2 v2) p
p(1 )(1 k)2(1 p+p(1 )) > 0. Therefore, b 2 (0; 1) for k 2 (k2; k1).
Proposition 7.
Proof. The equilibrium value of priv must satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints
v2   v1 + p (1  )T (1)  0 if priv = 1 (project 2),
v2   v1 + p (1  )T (priv) = 0 if priv 2 (0; 1) (mixed strategies),
v2   v1 + p (1  )T (0)  0 if priv = 0 (project 1),
(A16)
where T (priv)  max fkVpriv (priv; b (priv))  p; 0g  0.
Case 1. If v2  v1 > 0, then the IC condition for project 2, v2  v1+ p (1  )T (1)  0, is trivially
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satised as T (priv)  0 for any priv. On the other hand, there is no priv such that the IC
conditions for project 1 or for mixed strategies can be satised. Therefore, priv = 1 is the only
equilibrium.
Case 2. If v1   v2 > 0. Suppose rst that we have an equilibrium where priv > 0. From the IC
constraints, we know that we need T (priv) > 0, which implies b (priv) = 1. Thus, conditional on






[privv2 + (1  priv) v1   p]  (v1   v2)m (priv; 1) < 0 (A17)
because @m(priv ;1)@priv < 0 and privv2 + (1  priv) v1   p > 0. Therefore, the value for the option to
exit is minimized at priv = 1. Notice that, unlike the case of k = 0, there might be a set of values
 2 [0; 1] that minimize T (), because T () is no longer strictly positive.
If v1 v2p(1 )  T (1), then the IC condition for project 2 is satised for any priv, whereas there
is no priv < 1 such that the IC conditions for project 1 or for mixed strategies can be satised.
Therefore, priv = 1 is the only equilibrium.
If T (1) < v1 v2p(1 ) < T (0), as T (priv) is continuous and (weakly) decreasing in priv 2 (0; 1),
there exists a unique priv 2 (0; 1) such that T (priv) = v1 v2p(1 ) . In this case, the IC condition for
mixed strategies holds exactly at priv and upriv;1 = upriv;2.
If T (0)  v1 v2p(1 ) ; then the IC condition for project 1 is satised for any priv, while there is
no priv > 0 such that the IC conditions for project 2 or for mixed strategies can be satised.
Therefore, priv = 0 is the only equilibrium.
Case 3. v1 = v2. Dene the interval   [L; 1] = argmin T (). If T (1) > 0, then the IC
constraint for project 2 is satised with strict inequality, implying a unique equilibrium priv = 1.
In this case, L = 1 and  is a singleton.
If T (1) = 0, then T (priv) = maxfkVpriv (priv; b (priv))   p; 0g = 0 for any priv 2 [L; 1],
which implies that the insider is indi¤erent between any priv 2 [L; 1], proving the result.
Lemma 7.
Proof. The ex ante share values for the insider under projects 1 and 2 are
upriv;1  kVpriv (; b) + (1  ) f(1  p) [bkVpriv (; b) + (1  b)p] + p (1 + p)g (A18)
upriv;2  kVpriv (; b) + (1  ) f(1  p) [bkVpriv (; b) + (1  b)p)] + p (1 + p)g ; (A19)
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which are also the valuations for the investors at date 0, given our assumption that investors share
the same liquidity shock. Because investors do not know which project will be chosen at the time
they invest, in equilibrium they are willing to buy each share by upriv;2 + (1  )upriv;1, which
implies
 = 1  I






cpriv[upriv;2 + (1  )upriv;1]

[upriv;2 + (1  )upriv;1]




To prove this Lemma we have to consider three di¤erent cases.
(1) Suppose that k  k1. Thus, from Lemma 6 we have that b = 1. Dene
u1 (; k = 1)  Vpriv (; 1) + (1  ) [(1  p)Vpriv (; 1) + p (1 + p)] , (A22)
u2 (; k = 1)  Vpriv (; 1) + (1  ) [(1  p)Vpriv (; 1) + p (1 + p)] . (A23)
These are the ex ante utilities if k is 1. Thus,
upriv;1 = u1 (; k = 1)  [+ (1  ) (1  p)] (1  k)Vpriv (; 1) , (A24)
upriv;2 = u2 (; k = 1)  [+ (1  ) (1  p)] (1  k)Vpriv (; 1) . (A25)
The value of one share held by the insider is thus
upriv;2 + (1  )upriv;1 = u2 (; k = 1) + (1  )u1 (; k = 1)
  [+ (1  )] [ (1  p) + (1  ) (1  p)] (1  k)Vpriv (; 1) .(A26)
From Lemma 3, we know that u2 (; k = 1)+ (1  )u1 (; k = 1) = v2+(1  ) v1. Thus, from
(A21) we have
Wpriv = v2 + (1  ) v1  
I
cpriv
  [+ (1  )] [ (1  p) + (1  ) (1  p)] (1  k)Vpriv (; 1) . (A27)
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From
Vpriv (; b) =
 [v1 +  (v2   v1)] + (1  ) [1  p+ p (1  )] pb
+ (1  ) [1  p+ p (1  )] b , (A28)
we get
Wpriv = v2 + (1  ) v1  
I
cpriv
 (1  k) f [v2 + (1  ) v1] + (1  ) [1  p+ p (1  )] pg . (A29)
(2) Suppose that k 2 (k2; k1). In this case, the insider is indi¤erent between selling and not
selling and thus kV (; b ()) = p. We then have
upriv;1  p+ (1  ) [(1  p) p+ p (1 + p)] = p+ (1  ) v1, (A30)
upriv;2  p+ (1  ) [(1  p) p+ p (1 + p)] = p+ (1  ) v2. (A31)
Thus
upriv;2 + (1  )upriv;1 = v2 + (1  ) v1    [v2 + (1  ) v1   p] . (A32)
Thus, from (A21) we have
Wpriv = v2 + (1  ) v1  
I
cpriv
   [v2 + (1  ) v1   p] . (A33)
(3) Suppose that k  k2. From Lemma 6, b = 0. Thus,
upriv;1  kVpriv (; 0) + (1  ) v1, (A34)
upriv;2  kVpriv (; 0) + (1  ) v2. (A35)
Thus
upriv;2 + (1  )upriv;1 = v2 + (1  ) v1    [v2 + (1  ) v1   kVpriv (; 0)]
= v2 + (1  ) v1    (1  k) [v2 + (1  ) v1] . (A36)
Thus, from (A21) we have
Wpriv = v2 + (1  ) v1  
I
cpriv
   (1  k) [v2 + (1  ) v1] .
46
Proposition 8.
Proof. Dene w (k)  Wpriv  Wpub. The insider chooses the private structure if w (k) > 0.
With cpriv = cpub, the expression of w (k) simplies to w (k) = upriv   upub. Notice that the value
of upub does not depend on k, as k a¤ects the sale of shares only in the private case.
Part 1. If v1  v2, by Proposition 3, pub = 0, then upub = v1. If k < 1, the insider is strictly
worse o¤ by choosing the private structure, because under the private structure priv  0 and the
illiquidity cost L (k) is strictly positive.




(v2 v1)(1 ) , if  < L 
v2 v1
p2( 1) ,
0, if   L.
(A37)
By Proposition 6, priv = 1. Thus, upriv = v2   L (k). To show that there exists a k 2 (0; 1)
such that the insider chooses the private structure i¤ k  k, we need to show that w (k) is
nondecreasing and that a unique k 2 (0; 1) exists such that w (k) = 0. To prove the existence
of at least one k 2 (0; 1) such that w (k) = 0, it su¢ ces to show that the function w (k) has the
following properties: w (k) is continuous in k, w (0) < 0, and w (1) > 0. Existence thus follows
from the Intermediate Value Theorem. Continuity of w (k) is easily veried by inspection of the
function L (k).
(i) w (0) < 0. Proof: Consider rst the case of   L. In such a case, w (0) =Wpriv  Wpub =
(1  ) v2   v1. Because this function is decreasing in , it achieves a maximum at  = L, in
which case it becomes

1  v2   v1
p2 (   1)

v2   v1 = v2   v1  
v2 (v2   v1)
p2 (   1) (A38)
=   (v2   v1)
(1 + )
p(   1) < 0. (A39)
Thus w (0) is also negative for any  > L.
What about  < L? In this case, we have upub = v1 + 

pub (v2   v1) ; or
upub = v1 +
v2   v1   p2 (   1)
(1  ) ; (A40)
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which implies
w (0) = (1  ) v2   v1 +
v2   v1   p2 (   1)
(1  ) (A41)
= (1  ) v2   v1 + p
p (   1) (1  )  (1  )
(1  ) . (A42)
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to  yields
@w (0)
@
=  v2 + p
p (   1) (1  )  (1  )  p (   1) (1  )
(1  )2
(A43)
=  p [p (   1) + 1] (1  )
(1  )2
< 0. (A44)
Thus, the highest value of w (0) occurs when ! 0. As lim!0w (0) = v2  v2 = 0, then w (0) < 0
for all  > 0.





3 implies that pub < 1, thus w (1) > 0 if v2 > v1.
As a result, there exists at least one k 2 (0; 1) such that w (k) = 0.
Now we need to show that w (k) is nondecreasing. We have to consider the di¤erent regions in
which b = 0, 0 < b < 1, and b = 1. In Region 3 (k  k2), we have upriv = v2   (1  k)v2 (recall
that upriv =Wpriv+ Icpriv ; see Lemma 7 for the expressions for Wpriv in each case), which is strictly
increasing in k: In Region 2 (k2 < k < k1), we have upriv = p + (1  ) v2 , which is constant in
k. In Region 1 (k  k1), we have upriv = v2   (1  k) [v2 + (1  ) (1  p) p], which is strictly
increasing in k. Thus, upriv is increasing in regions 1 and 3, and constant in region 2. Therefore,
w (k) is nondecreasing in k.
Finally, to prove uniqueness, we have to rule out w (k) = 0 for k 2 [k2; k1]. As upriv is constant
in k in this region, it su¢ ces to show that w (k2) < 0. If   L, then upub = v1. Thus,
w (k2) = p+ (1  ) v2   v1, which is decreasing in . Substituting the expression of L, we have
that w (k2)j=L =  
v2 v1
p( 1) < 0. If  < L, then w (k2) = p+ (1  ) v2   v1  
(v2 v1) p2( 1)
(1 ) .
We have w (k2) = 0 trivially if  = 0, which is ruled out by assumption. For  > 0, we have
w (k2) < 0 ,  < 1, which is always true. Therefore, w (k2) < 0 for all , which implies that
k > k2. As w (k) is constant in [k2; k1] ; then k > k1. Because w (k) is strictly increasing for
k > k1, we have a unique k.
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1For an alternative incentive-based theory of the life cycle of speculative industries, see Biais,
Rochet, and Woolley (2009).
2Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011) provide evidence that the distinction between private-to-
private and public-to-private transitions is relevant. They nd that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) are
followed by growth if the targets are nancially constrained. LBOs are not followed by growth in
public-to-private transitions (and in private-to-private LBOs of nancially unconstrained targets).
Though our model has no explicit implications for rm growth, if growth is related to periods of
exploitation of existing technologies, then our model would predict that IPOs should be followed
by growth. Moreover, in line with the evidence in Boucly, Sraer, and Thesmar (2011), public-to-
private LBOs would be followed by restructuring or experimentation with an innovative process
but no immediate growth.
3We interpret the liquidity shock as any reason, other than private information, for the insider to
sell shares, including portfolio rebalancing, tax considerations, and behavioral biases. For evidence
of such motives to trade, see, e.g., Kallunki, Nilsson, and Hellström (2009).
4An extension of the model, in which the rm can also issue debt, can be found in some of the
older working paper versions.
5Lee et al. (1996) estimate that administrative and underwriting costs usually amount to ap-
proximately 11% of the IPO proceeds. IPO underpricing can create much higher costs, with total
costs reaching the 20%30% range (Ritter 1987). Seasoned equity o¤erings (SEOs) are less costly,
but discounts are also common, with a typical negative stock price reaction after announcements
of equity o¤erings of 3% of the pre-issue price (Asquith and Mullins 1986), to which direct costs of
roughly 7% of the proceeds should be added (Lee et al. 1996).
6Axelson et al. (2010) provide evidence that buyout activity increases in periods of low interest
rates and that, in such periods, shareholders of target rms are able to sell their shares at higher
premiums.
7Our results do not change qualitatively under the weaker assumption that there is a positive
probability under which the private investors cannot o¤er liquidity insurance to the insider. There
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are many reasons that can make the private investors unable to o¤er liquidity insurance. One
possibility is that all capital committed to a private equity fund has already been used. Even if
there is still capital available, fund covenants may impose limits on the amount of fund capital
invested in a single rm (Kaplan and Strömberg 2009). Fund covenants and restrictions on raising
additional capital can be rationalized as potential solutions to agency conicts between general
partners (fund managers) and limited partners (Axelson, Strömberg, and Weisbach 2009). Finally,
it could also be the case that funds need to exit early to produce evidence of good performance
and raise more capital (Gompers 1996).
8It may seem strange to assume that private buyers are in short supply but have no bargaining
power. This is only for simplicity; there is no loss of generality. All we need is that insiders have
some bargaining power. If insiders had no bargaining power ( = 1), then the existence of private
buyers would not improve the insiders situation, and thus sophisticated investors would play no
role in the model.
9Because b can only be nonzero if x1 = 0, b does not need to be conditional on the project
choice. For brevity, we omit the proof of this claim.
10We can also interpret an increase in  to be an improvement in stock liquidity, because a
higher  reduces the price impact of insider sales. Under this interpretation, improvements in stock
liquidity reduce the probability of innovation.
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Figure 2. Time line 
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Figure 4. b(k): probability of a late-consumer insider selling shares after x1 = 0 
